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THE UNDEAD PAST:
HOW COLLECTIVE MEMORY CONFIGURES TRADE
WARS
Sungjoon Cho
“The past is never dead. It's not even past.”
Abstract
Conventional narratives explicate the recent trade war between the
United States and China in realist terms, such as a hegemonic struggle
symbolized by the “Thucydides’ trap.” Yet this universalist heuristic fatally
omits ideational factors, such as beliefs, which are capable of
contextualizing a particular foreign affair. The U.S.-China economic
conflicts of today are characterized as much by past convictions as by
simple power politics. This Article aims to remedy this analytical blind spot
by employing the concept of “collective memory.” The central claim is that
the particular ways and forms in which the U.S. elites and the public
remember, and evoke, momentous economic conflicts of the past elucidate a
recidivistic pattern of exceptionalist trade policies of the United States.
While drawing from the past, collective memories manifest themselves in
the present tense for the present purpose. Three decades ago, the Cold War
and Japan-Bashing planted collective memories on economic warfare in the
minds of the U.S. policymakers and the public. Those collective memories,
this Article argues, shape how the Trumpian trade war is waged in the
present time. The Article also warns that false analogies triggered by such
collective memories may seriously distort the legal and economic reality of
the contemporary global sphere. This Article concludes that the United
States needs to be more susceptible to external opinions different from its
own, thereby cultivating counter-memories that can disabuse the United
States of those myths subscribed to by its power elites.
INTRODUCTION
“It’s time for us to end our vast deficits by making Japan, and others
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who can afford it, to pay,” argued Donald J. Trump emphatically in an open
letter published in New York Times on September 2, 1987.1 Fast forward
to the present day. The same man, now the President of the United States,
is acting on what he said more than three decades ago. The current trade
wars that the Trump administration has been waging against its major
trading partners, especially China, are an ironic déjà vu with a new
geopolitical twist.
Only months after he was sworn in, President Trump shocked the world
as he opened a salvo against the U.S.’ major trading nations. 2 In April
2017, his administration imposed punitive tariffs of 25 and 10 percent on
steel and aluminum imports, respectively, based on the highly controversial
national security concerns. 3 The U.S. trade partners, including Canada,
China and the European Union, found the justification behind these
tariffs— national security— both befuddling and offensive.4 Then, a year
later the Trump administration expanded its battleground. This time, it
aimed its trade artillery at one particular country, China, based on alleged
illegal and unfair intellectual property policies.5 In an unprecedented move,
the United States imposed 10 percent tariffs on Chinese imports worth $200
billion.6 After a series of tit-for-tats, both countries managed to reach a
truce in December 2019,7 which most observers view as still fragile.8
Conventional narratives explicate the recent trade war between the
United States and China on realist terms, such as the “Thucydides’ trap”9:
1
Donald J. Trump, There’s Nothing Wrong with America’s Foreign Defense Policy
That a Little Backbone Can’t Cure, NY TIMES (Sep. 2, 1987), at A 28 (emphasis original).
2
See generally Chad P. Bown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Upto-Date Guide, TRADE & INVESTMENT POL’Y WATCH BLOG (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf.
3
See Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box: The Growing Abuse of the
National Security Rationale for Restricting Trade, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, No. 874
(Jun. 25, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/closing-pandoras-boxgrowing-abuse-national-security-rationale; Peter Baker & Keith Bradsher, Trump Asserts
He Can Force U.S. Companies to Leave China, NY TIMES (Aug. 24, 2019).
4
Doug Palmer, Trump’s Global Trade War, POLITICO (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-duties-steel-aluminum-global-trade-war/.
5
Jim Tankersley & Keith Bradsher, Trump Hits China With Tariffs on $200 Billion in
Goods, Escalating Trade War, NY TIMES (Sep. 17, 2018).
6
Id.
7
Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States and China Reach
Phase One Agreement (Dec. 13, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2019/december/united-states-and-china-reach.
8
See e.g., Scott Kennedy, A Fragile and Costly U.S. – China Trade Peace,
COMMENTARY (The Center for Strategic and Int’l Stud.) (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/fragile-and-costly-us-china-trade-peace.
9
GRAHAM ALLISON, DESTINED FOR WAR: CAN AMERICA AND CHINA ESCAPE THE
THUCYDIDES’ TRAP? (2017).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559855

2020]

THE UNDEAD PAST

3

A hegemonic economic power (the United States) will naturally contain a
rising economic power (China) to maintain primacy in adopting and
enforcing global economic norms. While this rationalist theory offers,
through its universalist appeal, ample heuristic insights in comprehending
economic conflicts, it still leaves certain analytical blind spots along the
lines of ideational factors, such as values and beliefs. Cultural templates,
informed by the past, are capable of configuring a national policy even
without a strategic calculation.10
This Article aims to remedy these blind spots by employing the concept
of “collective memory” that refers broadly to the particular ways and forms
in which the U.S. elites and the public remember, and evoke, momentous
events of the past.11 This concept elucidates a recidivistic pattern of the
United States’ exceptionalist trade policies. Both the pattern and the
rationale behind the Trumpian trade wars bear a striking resemblance to
those associated with similar events in the U.S. history, in particular the
Cold War and Japan-Bashing during the Eighties and Nineties. This is not
just a fleeting resemblance. This Article claims that prior patters actually
guide, if not determine, the contemporary event in a similar situation. The
recurring pattern of bipartisan support behind U.S. trade warfare, among
others, corroborates the presence of collective memory on the aggressive
U.S. trade politics and triumphalism that such collective memory tends to
cultivate.12
Collective memory is more than a passive record of “collectively
remembered history.”13 Instead, it is an actively created memory box filled
with stories to tell. A memory box contains an “emplotment of events in an
affectively charged and mobilizing narrative.” 14 It is not a particular
historical anecdote that leads to a policymaker’s conviction; rather, that
anecdote simply “confirm[s] a conviction to which [policymakers] had been
brought by some deeper, perhaps unconscious processes of mind.”15 In this

10
See Stephen Bell, Institutionalism: Old and New, in GOVERNMENT, POLITICS,
POLICY AND POWER IN AUSTRALIA 1, 8 (Dennis Woodward, Andrew Parkin & John
Summers eds., 2002).
11
ERIC LANGENBACHER & YOSSI SHAIN, POWER AND THE PAST: COLLECTIVE
MEMORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 213-14 (2010). See also Moshe Hirsch,
Collective Memory and International Law 3 ESIL REFLECTIONS (Sep. 17, 2014).
12
Elizabeth S. Dahl, US American ‘Japan Bashing’ in the 1980s and Today’s ‘China
Threat’: Is History Repeating Itself?, Conference Paper presented at the 2012 East Asia
Security Symposium and Conference, at 5 (on file with the author).
13
Aleida Assmann, Transformations between History and Memory, 75 SOC.
RESEARCH 49, 68 (2008).
14
Id. at 55.
15
ERNEST R. MAY, “LESSONS” OF THE PAST: THE USE AND MISUSE OF HISTORY IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 84 (1975).
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sense, collective memory exhibits “social stereotypes” 16 or “strategic
myths.”17 Once stabilized, a particular belief system is crystallized into an
idée fixe, which either reinforces the previous collective memories or
constructs a new set of collective memories. Through the aforementioned
metaphoric structure, 18 memory-driven cognitive blasts from the past
function as “weapons of mass-instruction” 19 and shape contemporary
minds.
The current trade wars under the Trump administration, in particular the
one waged against China, is driven by two central themes: “containment”20
and “aggressive unilateralism.” 21 These ideological themes stem from
certain sets of collective memory held by the U.S. policy circle hearkening
back to the Cold War (in light of containment) and the era of the “Rising
Sun”22 or “Japan as Number One”23 and the resultant “Japan-Bashing” (in
light of aggressive unilateralism). Recall that the U.S. Senate once passed a
unanimous resolution (92-0) that condemned Japan as an unfair trading
nation.24
While drawing from the past, collective memories manifest in the
present tense for the present purpose. This “acceleration of history,”25 often
prompted by political exploitation, sheds critical light on the current trade
war.26 Images frozen within collective memory formulate strong messages
Noa Gedi & Yigal Elam, Collective Memory – What Is It?, 8 HIS. & MEMORY 30, 30
(1996).
17
Philip Lawrence, Strategic Beliefs, Mythology and Imagery, in BELIEF SYSTEMS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 147 (Richard Little & Steve Smith eds. 1988).
18
Barry Schwartz, Frame Images: Towards a Semiotics of Collective Memory, 121
SEMIOTICA, 1, 21 (1998) [hereinafter Frame Images].
19
Assmann, supra note 12, at 64 (quoting Charles Ingrao from his comment made at
the “History Textbooks in a Global Perspective” conference held at the University of
Chicago in April 2007).
20
Lawrence, supra note 17, at 147.
21
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 113 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
22
Dahl, supra note 12, at 4 (maintaining that negative stereotypes of Japan began to
appear in the American popular culture in mid-Eighties). See also John Schwartz et al.,
Japan Goes Hollywood, 63 NEWSWEEK (Oct. 9, 1989).
23
EZRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA (1979).
24
Peter T. Kilborn, Trade Fight with Japan, NY TIMES (Mar. 29, 1985); Donald H.
May, The Senate Passed a Resolution Thursday Urging President Reagan, UPI (Mar. 28,
1985).
25
Pierre Nora, Between History and Memory: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” 26
REPRESENTATIONS 8 (1989) (viewing that “a memory without a past that ceaselessly
reinvents tradition”).
26
“Compelling evidence shows Mr. Trump’s consistent “China bashing” in his tweets
and speeches won him votes in the areas most affected by outsourcing to China. A countylevel analysis published in December 2016 found that a 1-point increase in import
competition from China was associated with a 2.9% increase in support for Mr. Trump
16
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in a double-layered process of “intertextual” and “extratextual” framing.27
While intertextual framing connects a past event to a present one,
extratextual framing connects a past image to an interpreter’s knowledge
and perception of the present world. For example, collective memory on
the past U.S.–Japan trade war conjures up similar images in the current
U.S.–China trade war (intertextual framing). At the same time, the
incumbent power elites in the United States tend to perceive the alleged
current threat from China through the cognitive filter of past representations
of the U.S.–Japan trade war (extratextual framing).
Accordingly, activation of collective memory requires the existence of
“memory agents”28 who preserve and disseminate particular images of the
past to advance current political goals. They are liable to apply lessons they
learned from the past to the current affairs.29 Indeed, President Trump, in
the Eighties, openly advocated the use of tariffs against Japan which he
believed had “ripped off” the United States.30 Moreover, the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer, in his past career, chaired
the U.S.-Japan Investment Committee and led negotiations with Japan to
restrict Japan’s steel exports to the United States. 31 As a driving force
behind “aggressive unilateralism” against Japan, he firmly believes that the
Reagan administration’s trade war against Japan kept American steel
industry strong.32 Even after he left the Reagan administration, he worked
in a major Washington law firm as a lobbyist-cum-lawyer for the steel
industry. 33 Now as the USTR, he himself “carried” those collective
memories on trade confrontation with Japan in the Eighties onto the current
trade war against China.34
relative to earlier Republicans.” Niall Ferguson and Xiang Xu, Trump and the ‘Chimerica’
Crisis, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2018).
27
Schwartz, supra note 18, at 21; GALE MACLACHLAN & IAN REID, FRAMING AND
INTERPRETATION (1994).
28
Hirsch, supra note 11.
29
See Dan Reiter, Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the
Past, 46 WORLD POL. 490 (1994) (introducing a theory of “learning” in world politics and
arguing that lessons are drawn only from “high-impact events,” such as wars, in the past).
30
Jim Tankersley and Mark Landler, Trumpʼs Love for Tariffs Began in Japanʼs ʼ80s
Boom, NY TIMES (May 15, 2019).
31
Quinn Slobodian, You Live in Robert Lighthizer’s World Now, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Aug. 6, 2018).
32
Robert E. Lighthizer, Donald Trump Is No Liberal on Trade, WASH. TIMES (May 9,
2011).
33
Shawn Donnan, The Tough Negotiator Turning Trump's Trade Bluster into Reality,
INT’L TRADE DAILY (Sep. 21, 2018).
34
Carrier groups are defined as “groups that maintain or promote types of knowledge,
here an image of history, often with the goal of controlling memory or advancing a cause.”
Joachim J. Savelsberg & Ryan D. King, Law and Collective Memory, ANNU. REV. L. SOC.
SCI. 189, 191 (2007).
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Exploring a legacy of trade wars in light of collective memory brings
valuable insights. While collective memory can be touted as a useful
political tool, it is fundamentally a “symbolic construct,” 35 rather than
genuine representation of what actually happened. Thus, its users
unavoidably risk countenancing false analogies from their own versions of
the past. 36 These false analogies are prone to both legal and economic
misconduct. From a legal perspective, false analogies fuel political
adventurism that openly defies a time-honored multilateral trading system
symbolized by the World Trade Organization. 37 From an economic
perspective, tariff increases on such a large scale wreak havoc on both
domestic and global market.38
Moreover, collective memory is intersubjective. The U.S. activation of
collective memory on trade warfare is liable to trigger China’s own
collective memory on colonialism:39 The Chinese power elite and the public
perceive the U.S. pressure through the lens of humiliation.40 Chinese media
have even aired in prime time slots old war movies that glorified the
Chinese combat victory in defiance of the U.S. invasion at the Korean War
in the Fifties.41 We are dealing with the clash of two big echo chambers.
Then, what could be done for both countries to avoid the collision
course? In the foreseeable future, U.S. hegemonic power will make it
extremely difficult to escape from collective memories concerning the Cold
War and Japan-Bashing. As the U.S. policy elites are “relatively
impervious to evidence from the outside world which contradicts their
beliefs, 42 they often resist external criticisms and adhere to self35

Assmann, supra note 13, at 67.
Steve Smith, Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations, in Little &
Smith, supra note 17, at 25; RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN TIME:
THE USE OF HISTORY FOR DECISION-MAKERS (1986).
37
See Ana Swanson, Trump Cripples W.T.O. as Trade War Rages, NY TIMES (Dec. 8,
2019) (accusing the Trump administration of upending the WTO system).
38
Shawn Donnan & Joe Deaux, Trump’s New Tariff Threat Comes Amid Signs Job
Gains Peaking, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 6, 2019) (observing that most economists ascribe
punitive tariffs from trade wars as “economic malpractice”).
39
See PAUL FRENCH, BETRAYAL IN PARIS: HOW THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES LED TO
CHINA'S LONG REVOLUTION (2016).
40
See Alan Rappeport, 19th-Century ʻHumiliationʼ Haunts China-U.S. Trade Talks,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019) (linking the Chinese colonialist past to the current China-US
trade talks amid the trade war); The Plaza Discord, THE ECONOMIST (May 23, 2019)
(describing how the U.S. pressure in trade ignited nationalism among Chinese who evoked
memories of “unequal treaties” in the colonial era and even military confrontations
between the two countries in the Korean War in the Fifties).
41
See A Propaganda’s Own Goal, THE ECONOMIST (May 23, 2019); CCTV Airs Anti-US
Invasion War Movies, ASIA TIMES (May 20, 2019).
42
Richard Little, Belief Systems in the Social Sciences, in Little & Smith, supra note
17, at 49.
36
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rationalization. Any meaningful change must come from an identity shift
from both countries. In particular, the United States needs to be more
susceptible to external opinions different from its own and cultivate
counter-memories43 that can disabuse itself of those myths subscribed to by
its power elites. Social stereotypes cocooned in collective memory must be
challenged by competing versions of memories and given opportunities to
be re-constructed via the relentless work of both democratic deliberation
and academic endeavor.44 Only when the U.S. policymakers and the public
become disenchanted with their collective memories, will they be able to
pluck the deceiving mask of trade war. Admittedly, such enlightenment is a
tall order amid the contemporary populist political climate within the
United States.
Against this background, this Article unfolds in the following sequence.
Part I introduces the concept of collective memory, highlighting its
“presentist” nature. It also emphasizes that the effects of collective memory
on the contemporary affairs, such as trade wars, are best captured not by
positivist causality but by “narrative causality.” Part II then describes two
memory boxes, the Cold War and Japan-Bashing, in which several
recurring themes of trade war lie as indicators of collective memory. Part
III contends that the U.S. trade policies shaped by collective memories are
detrimental to both the world and domestic economy. It posits that
collective memories may seriously distort reality, both symbolic and
economic, of the contemporary global market. Part IV maintains that
collective memory on the Trumpian trade war, if left unchecked, is likely to
leave indelible marks on the minds of future American, and Chinese,
policymakers.
I. COLLECTIVE MEMORY
Collective memory, within the meaning of this Article, must be
distinguished from an actual memory in a neuro-scientific sense. It is not a
mere aggregation of individual recollections of certain past events.45 Nor
does it necessarily represent shared recollections of what actually happened.
Rather, it is more of a “stipulating,” 46 which reflects a certain moral,

43

Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED
ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS (1977).
44
Gedi & Yigal, supra note 15, at 30. Cf. MAY, supra note 14, at 190 (arguing that “if
history is to be better used in government, nothing is more important than that professional
historians discover means of addressing directly, succinctly, and promptly the needs of
people who govern”).
45
Nora, supra note 25.
46
SUSAN SONTAG, REGARDING THE PAIN OF OTHERS 85 (2003).
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ideological vision prevailing in a given time. 47 At a conceptual level, it
borders on the notion of social practice operating in a collective subconscious level, distinguished from a rational, deliberative realm. 48 For
example, collective memory is comprised of certain sets of philosophical
beliefs, such as a harmonious or conflictual nature of the political universe
(“operational code” 49 ) or the understanding of causality between
components of a given belief system (“cognitive map”50).
Collective memory is often contrasted with history. The two may
overlap to some degree in the sense that both, broadly speaking, concern
“publicly available social facts.” 51 But, while history addresses “dead,”
collective memory is interested in “living.”52 To wit, while history is the
“reconstruction” of the past, prone to “analysis and criticism,” collective
memory is an actual social phenomenon.53
Some scholars even blur the line between the two. They advance two
types of collective memory: one type concerns “historical events in their
transformation into collective memory.” 54 The other type considers
collective memory as a fiction invented for political or other functional
purposes. While the former focuses on the “first-order,” “episodic”
memory (what-where-when), the latter addresses the “second-order,” “selfreflexive” content that touches upon the present situation.55 This Article
focuses on the latter type. Thus, when collective memories are mobilized
for political purposes, they turn into an “ideology,” i.e. a “system of
interlinked ideas, symbols, and beliefs by which a culture – any culture –
seeks to justify and perpetuate itself.”56
Under this “presentist” approach to collective memory, the images of
the past are shaped by our contemporary interests 57 as the memory
47

Gedi & Yigal, supra note 16, at 30.
See notably PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1977).
49
Alexander L. George, The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study
of Political Leaders and Decision-Making, 13 INT’L STUD. Q. 190, 201-16 (1969).
50
Smith, supra note 36, at 23.
51
Jeffrey K. Olick, Collective Memory, INT’L ENCY. SOC. SCI. 7 (2nd ed.).
52
Id.
53
Nora, supra note 25, at 8-9.
54
Assmann, supra note 13, at 68. For example, collective memories regarding the
Holocaust committed by the Nazi Germany and sex slaves (comfort women) under the
Japanese war time rule.
55
Michaelian, Kourken and Sutton, John, Memory, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
(Summer
2017
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta
(ed.),
at
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/memory/
56
Sacvan Bercovitch, The Problem of Ideology in American Literary History, 12 CRIT.
INQ. 631, 635 (1986).
57
See Barry Schwartz, The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective
Memory, 61 SOC. FORCES, 374 (1982). See also Frame Images, supra note 18, at 2
48
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processes are often “manipulated and intervened in for sometimes urgent
purposes in the present.” 58 Understood this way, the main function of
collective memory can be said to provide a “silent language.”59 It shapes a
“belief system” of a society, which functions as a cognitive filter through
which information is channeled and given meanings.60 It remains taken-forgranted, and therefore hardly distinctive, to language-users themselves: it
may be objectified only to external observers. 61 Its characteristic
“persistence across time and change”62 helps constitute a collective identity
of a social group, such as a state. In this regard, Aleida Assmann observes
that:
Institutions and larger social groups, such as nations, governments,
the church, or a firm do not “have” a memory—they “make” one for
themselves with the aid of memorial signs such as symbols, texts,
images, rites, ceremonies, places, and monuments. Together with
such a memory, these groups and institutions “construct” an
identity.63
Finally, an epistemological note is in order. Attributing a current event
to collective memory might be a daunting task. Exploring correlational, if
not causal, traces of collective memories in a contemporary event might not
sound scientific to the eyes of positivists. The approach employed in this
Article, as is the case in human science in general, is not necessarily guided
by a testable hypothesis (theory). As seen in natural science, positivism
assumes that theories are separate from facts: the “language of theory” is
independent of the “language of observation.” 64
Facts are
“epistemologically prior” to theories. 65 Without this assumption, any
“testing” to validate, or invalidate, a theory is impossible. 66 Yet, the
problem is that those allegedly neutral facts have already been
“conceptually constituted by theories.”67 Such “theory-impregnated”68 facts
(describing collective memory as “orienting symbol” that “reveal[s] where we are in
relation to where we have been”).
58
EDWARD SAID, INVENTION, MEMORY AND SPACE 179 (2000).
59
EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (1973).
60
Smith, supra note 36, at 22
61
Little, supra note 42, at 42-43.
62
W. James Booth, The Work of Memory: Time, Identity, and Justice, 75 SOC.
RESEARCH, 237, 238 (2008).
63
Assmann, supra note 13, at 55.
64
Roger Tooze, Economic Belief Systems and Understanding International Relations,
in Little & Smith, supra note 17, at 132.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
John G. Gunnell, Philosophy and Political Theory, 14 GOV. & OPPOSITION, 198, 209
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are in a sense adulterated and only represent the “reality of the model.”69
Ideational factors, such as beliefs, collective intention, and collective
memory, cannot be observer-neutral. To substantiate the existence of a
belief system is to extract an intersubjective meaning from relevant social
facts, which requires a perspective of an analyst, i.e., interpretation. Here, a
sharp separation between an object and a subject, which is the
epistemological maxim of positivism, cannot stand. This is why positivism
cannot accommodate the understanding of belief systems, such as collective
memory.70
In sum, proving the effect of collective memory requires an “epistemic
reorientation.”71 It is basically a process of meaning-making, rather than
that of measurement.72 Therefore, effects of collective memory on current
affairs can be best captured by “narrative causality” that “traces the
historical evolution of meanings (both subjective and intersubjective) in
order to explain how they brought about, or made possible, a given social
context.” Unlike positive causality in natural sciences, narrative causality
aims to explore “variegated meanings and practices in time around a
number of ‘‘plots’’ or causal stories.”73
II. TWO MEMORY BOXES: THE COLD WAR AND JAPAN-BASHING
A. The Cold War
The Cold War provided U.S. politicians and policymakers with a
simplistic yet powerful ideology that constructed the U.S. national interest
through a Soviet threat. 74 Earlier postwar confrontations between the
United States and the Soviet Union, including the Cuban missile crisis,
created a salient set of collective memory in the minds of American
policymakers. Such collective memory translates into the Cold War
mentality, which assumes the “inherent bad faith of the Communist

(1979).
68
Saleha Mohsin, Mnuchin Faces Senate Democrat Pressure to Be Tough on China,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 1, 2019).
69
PIERRE BOURDIEU, CHOSES DITES (Things Said) 62 (1987) (cited in Vincent Pouliot,
“Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructive Methodology, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 359, 363 (2007)).
70
Tooze, supra note 64, at 127.
71
Id. at 128.
72
Pouliot, supra note 69, at 367 (emphasizing the necessity of “narrative-building” in
social sciences, which is defined as a “dynamic account that tells the story of a variety of
historical processes as they unfold over time”).
73
Pouliot, supra note 69, at 367.
74
Lawrence, supra note 17, at 162.
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model.”75 From the American perspective, this mentality functioned as a
powerful ideology that filtered all Soviet behavior: whatever the Soviets did
was interpreted to originate from malicious intentions. 76 This ideology
reproduced and consolidated earlier Cold War memory, which climaxed
when Ronald Reagan branded the USSR as an “Evil Empire.”
The current U.S. government evokes the same collective memory in
waging its trade war against China.77 According to the U.S. Department of
Defense, “China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to
intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China
Sea.”78 Tom Cotton, a junior Republican Senator from Arkansas, recently
labeled China as an evil empire as he co-sponsored a bill that would bolster
military alliance with Taiwan. 79 A private organization titled “The
Committee on the Present Danger: China” was recently founded in order to
“educate and inform American citizens and policymakers about the
existential threats presented from the Peoples Republic of China under the
misrule of the Chinese Communist Party.” 80 Likewise, there are an
increasing number of observations that the U.S. military-industrial complex
is nudging the U.S. multinational businesses to re-configure their global
supply chains in a way which disassociates them from China.81
From a geopolitical standpoint, the trade war between the United States
and China may have already begun in the Obama administration.82 Hilary
Clinton, the then-Secretary of State, championed the negotiation of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement under the newly-minted banner
of the “Pivot to Asia.”83 President Obama urged the Senate to pass the TPP

75

HENRY KISSINGER, THE NECESSITY OF CHOICE 201 (1962).
Lawrence, supra note 17, at 147.
77
Jeffrey Sachs, Donald Trump’s Cold War Tactics Will Not Work with China, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019). See also Edward Luce, Getting Acclimatized to the US-China Cold
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by warning that “if we don’t write the rules, China will.” 84 The thenSecretary of Defense Ashton Carter even averred that “in terms of our
rebalance in the broadest sense, passing TPP is as important to me as
another aircraft carrier.”85
Critically, the Cold War collective memory connotes an ideological
righteousness, or even superiority, of U.S. foreign policies, and it provides a
veil of justification with trade warfare. The rise of the “Blue Team” at the
end of the century can be said to have “carried” the Cold War collective
memory. A loose network of the U.S. academics, government officials and
politicians promoted the view that “China is a rising and hostile power
destined to threaten U.S. vital interests” and advocated a containment
strategy, including “tak[ing] a harder line on China’s human rights and
unfair trade practices” as well as “restrict[ing] technology transfers with
military significance.” 86 Likewise, a recent revealing statement made by
Jeff Colgan and Robert Keohane points to the shaping power of collective
memory. Colgan and Keohane submit that:
Washington should nurture a uniquely American social identity and
a national narrative. That will require othering authoritarian and
illiberal countries … such as China and Saudi Arabia. Done
properly, that sort of othering could help clarify the American
national identity and build solidarity … It might at times constrain
commercial relationships. However, a society is more than just an
economy, and the benefits of social cohesion would justify a modest
economic cost.87
B. Japan-Bashing
The Trumpian trade war is silhouetted by the bitter aftershock of the
Wall Street financial crisis of 2007. While open market and free trade has
84
The White House, Remarks by the President on Trade (May 8, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/08/remarks-presidenttrade.
85
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State
University)
(Apr.
6,
2015),
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86
G. John Ikenberry & Michael Mastanduno, Conclusion: Images of Order in the
Asia-Pacific and the Role of the United States, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND
THE ASIA-PACIFIC 421, 433 (G. John Ikenberry & Michael Mastanduno eds. 2003).
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(May/Jun. 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-04-17/liberal-orderrigged.
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usually been an elitist, top-down project, it has always been vulnerable to a
popular, bottom-up political backlash in times of economic hardship. 88
Politicization of trade policies unexceptionally summons collective memory
on mercantilism. While this particular set of collective memory is
suppressed in relatively good economic times, it is often triggered by socioeconomic crises. For example, politicians take bilateral trade deficits
seriously, defying a broad consensus among economists. 89 They often
attribute, wrongly, domestic unemployment to foreign competition. They
also omit “surpluses” in trade in services.
Finally, they ignore
overwhelming contributions of foreign trade to the increase of national
welfare in general.
These caricatures on foreign trade become
vernacularized, as seen in certain pejorative or accusative slogans, such as
“unfair” trade; trade “imbalance”; currency “manipulator”; “predatory”
practice, “socialist” market economy,90 SOEs, among others.
The unique U.S. political culture often facilitates the reproduction of
collective memory by institutionalizing past belief systems in legal texts.
There exists a deep-rooted distrust on the centralized government power.91
Ronald Reagan famously stated that the government is the problem, not the
solution.92 Out of this de-centric political culture emerged a “private USTR
model” under various trade remedy laws, including Super and Special
Section 301.93 Under these trade remedy laws, the government seldom self88

Thomas R. Howell, Trade Protection: Rethinking the American Perspective, 25
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Committee on International Relations United States House of Representatives (Jul. 22,
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Institute,
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initiates an unfair trade investigation against a foreign trading partner.
Instead, it waits for a domestic producer’s specific petition against an
alleged unfair trade practice by a foreign country. This “legalistic and
judgmental [process] operates in a very haphazard way,” often baffling
foreign trading partners for the U.S. government’s sheer inability to
articulate its real interests.94
In what may be called “mnemonic socialization,” 95 these highly
symbolic statutes de-freeze past images on trade confrontation and create
mnemonic links to the current trade war with China. Those statutes are
designed in a combative, and therefore unilateral, fashion in that the U.S.
government plays the police, prosecutor, judge, and jury as to foreign
trading nations’ alleged violations of trade rules. They expose the
incumbent policymakers to “ocular introjection” that “instills knowledge
and strength through communication with the past.” 96 Thus, such
institutionalization facilitates the access, reproduction, and distribution of a
particular set of collective memory on confronting alleged unfair foreign
trade practices.97 This remedial forum espouses a type of commemorative
practice, 98 relying on symbolic particles of collective memory, such as
“unfair trade” or “trade imbalances.” It provides an effective “analogical
device” with which to “evoke an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern
of events associated . . . with the symbol.”99 In other words, “symbols of
past evil can serve as analogical references that bolster calls for legal (and
other) intervention in conflict.” 100 This is how the past Japan-bashing
informs the present China-bashing.
Granted, the construction and reconstruction of collective memories is
the establishment of a beneficial precedent” based on an annual “National Trade Estimate”
(NTE) report issued by USTR. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2420, 2241 (b). The 1988 Act also launched
other breeds of unilateral trade measures, i.e., “Special 301” and “Telecommunication
301.” Special 301 is an intellectual property right (IPR) version of Super 301 designed to
identify priority foreign countries which fail to provide adequate IPR protection to U.S.
firms and to negotiate with, and if necessary retaliate against, these countries under the
Section 301 process. 19 U.S.C. § 2413.
94
Id. at 260. See also J. Michael Finger, The Meaning of “Unfair” in United States
Import Policy, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 35, 41 (1992) (spotlighting the “American
obsession with regulation through formalized rules” in trade statutes).
95
Eviatar Zerubavel, Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past, 19 QUAL.
SOC. 283, 286 (1996).
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Frame Images, supra note 18, at 16.
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Savelsberg & King, supra note 34, at 190; Joachim J. Savelsberg & Ryan D. King,
Institutionalizing Collective Memories of Hate: Law and Law Enforcement in Germany
and the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 579 (2005).
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not always smooth, nor are the consequences necessarily coherent. It is a
continuing process of negotiation between and among competing
versions, 101 prone to the “Rashomon effect.” 102 It is especially so when
collective memory constitutes a conative memory regarding questions of
values, morality, and justice.103 Since some cultural meanings are “freefloating” and do not represent a “specific bearer,”104 they fail to register in
collective minds strongly enough to endure. For example, the notorious
Smoot-Hawley Tariffs Act of 1930 might function as a counter-symbol for
any aggressive unilateralism.
Yet collective memory tends to be
constructed in a highly selective manner. Regarding trade confrontation,
foreign evils appear more salient in collective minds of the U.S. policy
elites than domestic evils, such as the Smoot-Hawley Act. 105 Indeed,
domestic evils are prone to collective amnesia,106 failing to counteract the
construction of collective memory focused on foreign evils. This
asymmetry in the construction of collective memory on trade confrontation
tends to limit conditions for legal change required to align the U.S. law with
the WTO norms.107
The prevalent version of collective memory provides a rich repository
of symbolic resources necessary to package particular diagnoses and
prognoses in a coherent manner. 108 Even when domestic mercantilists
attack foreign mercantilists, the former still needs to avoid the burden of
“cognitive dissonance” 109 and legitimate their call for aggressive
unilateralism. The logic of “fair” trade is a case in point. While
unilateralist trade penalties contradict the free trade principle, politicians
attempt to overcome the contradiction (dissonance) by justifying those trade
restrictions (unfree trade) as a necessary remedy to unfair trade practices by
foreign trading partners. Notably, China’s alleged unfair trade practices and
consequent economic carnage to U.S. business and labor have been the
Trump administration’s justification of trade wars with China. Yet this selfrighteous unfair trade logic actually hearkens back to Japan’s economic
101
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COMM. 250 (2016).
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Ross Poole, Memory, Responsibility, and Identity, 75 SOC. RESEARCH, 263, 282
(2008).
105
Savelsberg & King, supra note 34, at 203.
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dominance in the Eighties and the Nineties. It is the same bashing yet
against a different trading partner. As the then USTR highlighted structural,
and even cultural, barriers erected by Japan,110 the current USTR accused
China of state capitalism.
Importantly, it is euphoria of triumphalism that facilitates the
invocation, and reinvention, of collective memories by U.S. policymakers.
The end of the Cold War bestowed upon the U.S. elites a paramount sense
of self-pride, often symbolized by the “End of the History,” with the
vanishing existential security risks. Soon afterwards, the Washington
Consensus steered democratization and marketization in the former Soviet
region. A similar sense of triumphalism pervaded in the Reagan
administration when the United States successfully pressured Japan to sign
the Plaza accord and the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) in an effort
to resolve the alleged trade imbalances between the two countries on the
U.S. terms. The Plaza accord promptly depreciated the U.S. dollar against
the Japanese currency.111 The SII was designed to dramatically increase the
U.S. firms’ access to the Japanese market through a strong de-regulatory
drive. While it is still controversial whether these extraordinary policies
indeed narrowed the gap of trade deficits between the two countries, it is
this particular set of triumphant collective memories that appears to drive
the Trump administration to impose “terms for a surrender” on China amid
the current trade war.112 No wonder President Trump declared that “trade
wars are good and easy to win.”113
Notably, those collective memories on trade warfare are often preserved
and disseminated by certain groups of individuals, which may be labeled
“carrier groups” 114 or “memory agents.”115 For example, the current trade
hawks in the Trump administration, in particular Robert Lighthizer (the
USTR), Wilbur Ross (the Secretary of Commerce), and Peter Navarro
(Senior Trade Advisor), hold deep connections with the U.S. steel industry.
In his past career, Lighthizer chaired the U.S.-Japan Investment Committee
and led negotiations with Japan to restrict Japan’s steel exports to the

110
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United States. 116 As a Wall Street veteran financier, Ross bought up
troubled steel companies and consolidated into a new one (International
Steel Group Inc.).117 He then sold the new company to the London-based
steel empire, ArcelorMittal, on whose board he served until he joined the
Trump administration. Nucor, the largest steel producer in the United
States, provided funding to Navarro’s production of the controversial
documentary, “Death by China.”118 Given that the U.S. steel industry has
always been at the epicenter of trade warfare, then and now, private
memories of these power elites tend to carry collective memories of past
trade wars.
In particular, Lighthizer’s biographical background merits special
attention. In 1983, in his mid-thirties, Robert Lighthizer was appointed a
deputy USTR and chaired the U.S.-Japan Investment Committee, leading
steel imports negotiations with Japan. He was a driving force behind
“aggressive unilateralism” propelled by the Reagan administration in the
Eighties, especially against Japan.119 He stated that:
The icon of modern conservatism, Ronald Reagan, imposed quotas
on imported steel, protected Harley-Davidson from Japanese
competition, restrained import of semiconductors and automobiles,
and took myriad similar steps to keep American industry strong.120
After he left the Reagan administration, he worked in a major
Washington law firm (Skadden) for an extensive period of time as a
lobbyist-cum-lawyer for the steel industry.121 Indeed, most of trade lawyers
under the current administration came from the same law firm, one of
whose main customers is the steel industry.122
Admittedly, individual memories must be distinguished from collective
memories. Following Emile Durkheim’s thesis of collective representation,
memoriologists, dating back to Maurice Habwachs, emphasize the essential
distinction between private memory as individual images and collective
memory as social phenomena. 123 Yet, collective memory can be
116
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instantiated only through individual memory: society is where individuals
can “retrieve” their recollections. 124 Invocation of private (biographical)
memory concretizes the operation of collective memory. As Habwachs
aptly observed, while people acquire their memories “in society,” they also
recall and recognize them “in society.”125
C. Recursive Themes of Trade War as Indicators of Collective Memory
This Article does not claim that the current trade war with China is a
carbon copy of the past trade war with Japan. Obviously, China is not
Japan. 126 Back then, Japan never retaliated; today, China is retaliating.
Instead, the main point here is that the underlying assumptions, and
prejudices, on the basis of which the United States addressed the titular
“Japan problem” have been somehow crystallized and registered, in the
form of collective memory, in the minds of both power elites and the
public.127 It is this particular set of collective memories that provides the
current Trump administration with a cognitive schema through which it is
dealing with the alleged “China problem” via trade war. One might
demonstrate the symbolic power of collective memory by identifying
certain recurring themes common to the past and the present trade war.
Once incumbent trade officials within the Trump administration recognize
the patterns, they are likely to repeat similar types of reactions available in
the collective memory box.
First comes hegemonic angst. If China is the U.S.’s strategic competitor
of today, in the 80-90’s Japan was the U.S.’s newly found adversary. As
Japan became an international economic powerhouse and began to threaten
U.S. status, the U.S. government vehemently attacked Japan for the latter’s
alleged “inability or unwillingness to restrain the one-sided and destructive
expansion of its economic power.”128 For example, James Fallows argued
that:
Unless Japan is contained, therefore, several things that matter to
America will be jeopardized: America's own authority to carry out
Monahan & E.F. Loftus, The Psychology of Law, 33 ANN. REV. PSY. 371 (1982)
124
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trans. 1992).
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126
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127
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(1992).
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its foreign policy and advance its ideals, American citizens' future
prospects within the world's most powerful business firms, and also
the very system of free trade that America has helped sustain since
the Second World War.129
Public opinion polls at that time revealed that ordinary people had
perceived the threat from Japan's growing economic power more seriously
than that from the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. 130
Democratic
congressman Jack Brooks even opined that “the U.S. should have dropped
four nuclear bombs on Japan, not just two.”131 Such hegemonic angst is
further fueled by the “plot structure” innate to collective memory. 132
Collective memory is formulated, preserved, and passed on in stories.
Within the plot-structure of collective memory, the United States is
portrayed an innocent, and righteous, victim, while its adversaries, such as
Japan and the Soviet Union, are demonized as “cheaters” or an “evil
empire” intentionally and maliciously attempting to undermine the U.S.
national interests.
An intriguing variation of collective memory on hegemonic angst is
collective memory on frustration, or even betrayal. In the 80’s, the United
States criticized Japan for its willful abandonment of free trade principles to
the U.S.’s detriment. The United States found Japan to be ungrateful in
betraying the nation that guided and helped it into the unprecedented
economic prosperity in the postwar era. Again, James Fallows opined that:
There is a basic conflict between Japanese and American interests . .
. . That conflict arises from Japan's inability or unwillingness to
restrain the one-sided and destructive expansion of its economic
power. The expansion is one-sided because Japanese business does
to other countries what Japan will not permit to be done to itself. It
is destructive because it will lead to exactly the international
ostracism that Japan most fears, because it will wreck the postwar
system of free trade that has made Japan and many other nations
prosperous, and because it will ultimately make the U.S.-Japanese
partnership impossible to sustain.133
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Fast forward to the present, Fallows’ frustration three decades ago
echoes in the evaluation on Chinese trade policies by the current U.S.
administration. In an annual report to Congress, the USTR concluded that:
[T]he United States had erred in supporting China’s entry into the
WTO on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing
China’s embrace of an open, market-oriented approach to the
economy and trade.134
Second comes de-multilateralization. As the United States criticizes the
WTO as having been incapable of disciplining China’s alleged unfair trade
practices, the United States blamed the GATT in the 80-90’s for the its
failure to effectively address Japan’s trade barriers. For example, Pat
Choate argued that:
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as a
foundation for global trade, is fundamentally flawed. Japan has
ignored its GATT obligations, taking advantage of open markets
wherever it can while keeping its markets closed through a variety
of formal and informal barriers.135
Third comes structural-cultural barriers.
The U.S. government
attributed unfair trade practices by the Japanese government, which
allegedly contributed to massive bilateral trade deficit between the two
countries, to the unique economic governance structure in Japan,
symbolized by “Japan Inc.” 136 The U.S. government believed that the
postwar economic miracle in Japan was not a product of the Western,
neoliberal free market capitalism. Instead, the Japanese government, as a
master architect, picked the winners and subsidized them, both fiscally and
financially, to achieve national goals within the context of well-crafted
economic development blueprints. Large private enterprises were also wellstructured in the form of vertical integration (keiretsu), which enabled the
Japanese government to nurture so-called “strategic” industries, such as
supercomputers.137 As these Japanese strategic industries, such as Toshiba,
became competitive and threatened the U.S. rivals, such as Intel, the U.S.
USTR, 2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance 5 (Feb. 2019),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018-USTR-Report-to-Congress-on-China%27s-WTOCompliance.pdf.
135
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136
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government labeled Japan’s economic planning as pathological and
pressured Japan to remedy it.138
Here, the U.S. government confuses the “depth of legal and economic
differences” 139 with strategic policies and converts the former into some
type of trade “barriers.”140 Designating Japan as a “capitalist developmental
state,” some pundits in the 80’s criticized Japan for its alleged “strategies to
suppress consumption, channel personal savings to industrial investment,
and convert industrial competition into a ratchet-like process.” 141
According to this view, the Japanese propensity to save somehow derived
from the deliberate government policy.
Likewise, the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) accused
Japan of allegedly “unreasonable” market structure, which SIA argued
constituted a trade barrier in and of itself. 142 For example, Charles
Kaufman observed that:
Aiming particularly at equipment and process technology for VLSI
[Very Large Scale Integration]-level integration, favorable rate loans
were issued for development of key technologies. MITI [Ministry of
International Trade and Industry] labs joined with manufacturers to
coordinate research, formulate standards, and “rationalize” the
industry by limiting competition in specific sectors. All of this
occurred within a relaxed antitrust environment. Japanese firms
ultimately dominated the DRAM market through superior VLSI
technology, with Toshiba introducing the first 64K DRAMs.143
Indeed, even Japanese society itself was singled out as a source of unfair
trade practices.144 Carla Hills, the USTR under the Bush administration in
the Nineties, designated the whole nation as an unfair trader (“priority
foreign country”) under the so-called “Super 301” law (Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act 1988) based on the “number and pervasiveness” of
138
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139
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140
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their “acts, policies, or practices” that impede U.S. exports.145 In sum, as
Daniel Tarullo aptly observed, the U.S. attack seemed to be against the
“Japanese way of life” and to therefore hold the Japanese government
responsible for “altering the habits and preferences of the Japanese
people.”146
The U.S. pressure against Japan in the 80-90’s echoes through the U.S.’
harsh reaction against China’s masterplan of “Made in China 2025” in
which the Chinese government planned to nurture, through state
intervention, strategic industries, ranging from AI to quantum computing.
As in the 80’s, the U.S.’s therapeutic attitude toward China’s economic
policies appears to be oblivious to the fact that China “has its own cultural
background, its own way of thinking, and its own way of doing
business.”147
Fourth comes targeting.
Despite the U.S. government’s harsh
accusation of Japanese anti-market industrial policies, its coercive remedial
methodologies dramatically contravened market principles. The U.S.
government strongly preferred numerical, “result-oriented” 148 agreements
with Japan to boost its access to the U.S.’s key markets, such as auto and
semiconductor, in a relatively short period of time. It was “in effect saying
to the Japanese government ‘we don't care how you do it, just make sure
imports of our products increase.’”149 Underneath the U.S. approach did lie
a concealed assumption:
Once Japan liberalizes its markets, Yankee traders will swarm into
the country selling American products. The streets of Tokyo will be
clogged with Chevrolets and the traditional love for sashimi and eel
will crumble in favor of a taste for American beef and potatoes. The
traditional U.S. economic base will rise like a Phoenix from the
ashes and we will return to the halcyon days of unquestioned U.S.
economic leadership.150
The “Market-Oriented, Sector-Specific” (MOSS) talks in the Reagan era
are case in point. 151 For example, under the MITI’s supervision private
145
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companies initiated “voluntary” plans to buy foreign (American) products
under the euphemistic banner of “international cooperation program.” 152
Likewise, the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA)
pledged that “auto manufacturers would expand their purchasing of auto
parts –both imports and local purchasing at US plants – by six categories,
every six months for the following five years.”153 In the late 90’s, Japan
began to resist the U.S. targeting approach. Interestingly, Japan’s departure
from the earlier position coincided with the launch of the new WTO system.
In defiance of the Clinton administration’s numerical targets, Japan made a
rare move as it filed a formal complaint before the newly created WTO
DSM.154
This numerical targeting has re-emerged in the current negotiations
between the United States and China. In the U.S. proposed framework
leaked in the Chinese media, the United States demanded that “the U.S.
trade deficit with China will have decreased compared to 2018 by at least
$200 billion by the end of 2020.” 155 Eventually, the U.S. government
managed to install such a numerical target in its most recent “Phase One”
trade deal with China: China agreed to purchase $40 billion agricultural
products from the United States.156
III. REPERCUSSIONS FROM COLLECTIVE MEMORY: THE WARPED REALITY
A. Symbolic Effect: Diverging from the Authentic Legal Reality
The legal reality of the WTO community is a “symbolic universe”157
that exists only when members of that community believe it exists. A
symbolic universe, as well as a particular version of legal reality it
represents, is comprised of certain linguistic patterns, such as legal claims
and doctrine. Thus, it is WTO norms that instantiate the WTO reality.158
WTO norms, including institutional practice (acquis) of the WTO,
constitute a collective identity of WTO members and indoctrinate its
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members in their trade relations. 159 The WTO norms qua social fact
“attains a firmness in [WTO members’] consciousness: it becomes real . . .
and it can no longer be changed so readily.”160 In other words, the WTO
norms are taken for granted as the “unproblematic” legal lifeworld.161
Yet the WTO’s symbolic universe remains precarious due mainly to the
innate ambiguity of language itself. An individual WTO member may hold
its own version of the symbolic universe in a given issue that diverges from
an official one held by the WTO. Indeed, rule-following or norm
internalization often requires a taxing process of assimilating one’s own
symbolic universe, comprised of a long-held way of thinking and way of
life, to an unaccustomed one imposed, not necessarily suggested, by an
alien entity (WTO).162 Therefore, the WTO needs to maintain its official
symbolic universe through a meaning-integrating mechanism like its
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). The WTO preserves its official
reality against an individual member’s subjective symbolic universe by
designating the member’s “inferior cognitive status,”163 i.e., “violation,” to
the extent that the member contradicts the WTO. This symbolic response is
necessary to maintain the WTO’s symbolic universe so that legal realities
under the WTO remain coherent, i.e., secure and predictable.164
Waging trade wars means a complete departure from the WTO’s
symbolic universe. It goes beyond mere instances of violation in which a
violating nation still accepts the WTO’s authority to replace the violator’s
subjective symbolic universe with the WTO’s own official symbolic
universe. Ignoring the DSM, waging a trade war is tantamount to a
“nihilation” 165 of the WTO’s “symbolic power” 166 as if a chess player
159
See Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 47
INT’L ORG. 567(1993); MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
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160
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161
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ON HABERMAS’S THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 24 (Axel Honneth & Hans
Joas eds. 1991) (“Subjects acting communicatively always come to an understanding in the
horizon of a lifeworld … formed from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic,
background convictions … [it] serves as a source of situation definitions that are
presupposed by participants as unproblematic … The lifeworld also stores the interpretive
work of preceding generations.”).
162
BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 157, at 82.
163
Id., at 66.
164
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
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3:2.
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166
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refuses to acknowledge a checkmate.167 It is a form of “self-orientation”
against “collective orientation.” 168 It is this nihilation that provides a
symbolic underpinning of trade wars.
The U.S. collective memory on trade confrontation, in particular that of
de-multilateralization, tends to secure its own subjective symbolic universe
on trade governance, in the form of a legal “enclave,” such as Section 301,
at the heart of the multilateral trading system. In tandem with the U.S.’s
hegemonic status, its unique collective memory provides a persuasive
account of legal ambivalence. Indeed, the United States has never fully
internalized the WTO system, both legally and politically. For example, the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), enacted in 1994 as an
implementation act of the WTO Agreements, provides that:
SEC. 102. RELATIONSHIP OF THE AGREEMENTS TO UNITED
STATES LAW AND STATE LAW. (a) RELATIONSHIP OF
AGREEMENTS TO UNITED STATES LAW.— (1) UNITED
STATES LAW TO PREVAIL IN CONFLICT.—No provision of any of
the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such
provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any
law of the United States shall have effect. (2) CONSTRUCTION.—
Nothing in this Act shall be construed— (A) to amend or modify any
law of the United States, including any law relating to— (i) the
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health, (ii) the protection of
the environment, or (iii) worker safety, or (B) to limit any authority
conferred under any law of the United States, including section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, unless specifically provided for in this Act.169
We may all agree that trade wars would bring disastrous consequences
to the world trading system. Most people tend to interpret these
consequences as material ones, such as the fatal decrease of trade volume.
Yet the true meaning of trade wars goes beyond a material dimension,
which is why trade wars could leave more serious damages than calculable
losses on trade volume. We tend to perceive trade merely as a transaction
(contract) in which each party struggles to outsmart the other and extract
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167
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better terms, such as better market access.170 According to this rationalist
view, trade wars are not very different from normal trade negotiations in
that trading nations strive to maximize their mercantilist balance sheets, i.e.,
more exports and fewer imports.
However, what trade wars reveal is something graver than a surface
reality represented by shrinking numbers. The real catastrophe of trade
wars is an irreversible disintegration of the WTO’s social reality, i.e.,
symbolic universe, which provides security and predictability not only to
WTO members but also to individual economic players.171 The magnitude
of harm caused by an anomic situation created by trade wars appears to be
incalculable. The culture of trade wars is both contagious and selffulfilling. 172 Trading nations are likely to be suspicious of each other’s
measure. Perhaps history might be the only guide for such an epic failure.
How could WTO members discuss the WTO’s ultimate moral goal, i.e.,
“development,”173 in such an anomic atmosphere?
B. Practical Effect: Diverging from the Authentic Economic Reality
Even material reality is socially constructed and therefore shaped by a
prevailing belief system, which is influenced by a prevailing set of
collective memory in a given society. 174 For example, the U.S. nuclear
170
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Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38WORLD POL. 226(1985).
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Pew Research Center (Aug. 13, 2019) (implying that the current bilateral tensions between
the United States and China tends to aggravate the U.S. public attitudes toward China). See
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13, 2019).
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strategy in the Cold War era was driven by the then-held collective memory
regarding the Soviet Union, not necessarily by hard empirical evidence.175
For another example, the Bush administration’s nearly religious conviction
on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, despite the
opposite fact-finding by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
led to the second Iraqi War. 176 After all, when politicians cannot locate
hard evidence congenial to their theory, they tend to treat the theory as if it
were reality.177 As discussed above, it is collective memory that effectively
molds such abstract theorizing. According to the Trump administration’s
theory extrapolated from the Cold War memory, China is a national security
threat, as if it were the Soviet Union, which must be contained by all
means.178
In order to justify its theory based on collective memory, politicians are
often “manipulating certain bits of the national past, suppressing others,
elevating still others in an entirely functional way.” 179 For example, the
U.S. government exaggerates the importance of bilateral deficits in goods
trade in direct defiance to economic principles, omits trade “surplus” in
services trade, attributes domestic unemployment to foreign competition,
and ignores overwhelming contributions of foreign trade to the increase of
national welfare in general.180 More often than not, intellectuals who are
not economists, subscribe to the same misdiagnosis, which in turn generates
wrong prescriptions.181
The authentic economic reality based on economists’ consensus
World Economic Reality, in Edward Elgar Research HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 369 (Moshe Hirsch and Andrew Lang eds., 2018) [hereinafter World
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on a flawed assumption that China will collapse from the “seeds of its own decay.”).
179
SAID, supra note 58, at 179.
180
See Philip Stephens, Trump’s Angry Unilateralism Is a Cry of Pain, FIN. TIMES
(May 10, 2019) (observing that President Trump is “trapped in a world where economic
might was indeed measured by auto sales, trade was essentially about tariffs (…).”
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contradicts the false theory behind trade wars. While the U.S. government
often attributes domestic economic maladies, such as job losses, to unfair
foreign trade practices, economists advance a very different diagnosis, such
as technological change and macroeconomic policies. 182 More than three
decades ago, Paul Krugman, the Nobel laureate in economics, aptly refuted
the fiction behind the U.S. government’s aggressive trade policies against
foreign trading partners. He observed that:
The broad conclusion is that the industrial policies of foreign
governments have not been a serious problem for the United States .
. . [T]he actual policies followed by our major industrial competitors
do not appear to have had important malign effects. This leaves the
question of why there is so much support for the view that the
actions of foreign governments are the cause of many of our
problems. The answer is unfortunately depressingly obvious: over
the past decade U.S. economic performance has been disappointing
by any standard, and it is simply easier to blame foreigners than
ourselves.183
Likewise, the U.S.’s recent gravity-defying moves to reconfigure GVCs
in an effort to thwart China’s rise in high-tech areas tend to bring forth
economic consequences disastrous both to foreign and domestic
industries. 184 For example, if the U.S. government prohibits Chinese
industrial champions, such as Huawei, from entering into the U.S. market
on strategic grounds, the ban will irreversibly disrupt many U.S. companies’
supply chains and only benefit Huawei’s foreign competitors.185
IV. PROGNOSIS: INDELIBLE MEMORY
At a deeper level, the U.S.’s collective memory on trade warfare is
anchored by what Karl Polanyi called “economistic fallacy”186 sustained by
its hegemonic power. What is commonly observed in the United States or
in the West in general is an economic belief that the economic sphere is,
and should be, separated from the socio-political sphere. This myth of
182
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“normalcy” of self-regulating market “countenances, even demands, the
eradication of communities of difference.” 187 A hegemonic international
economic order, such as the Washington Consensus, “functions mainly by
consent in accordance with universalist principles” and “rests upon a certain
structure of power and serves to maintain that structure.”188
In this regard, non-Western economic beliefs are often discounted,
regarded illegitimate and even labeled “ideological,” which means “nonscientific”: they are even considered as “a political attempt to change the
nature of the international economic system.” 189 The U.S.’s fierce attack
against the Chinese state capitalism could be understood along the same
lines. Importantly, however, the Washington Consensus is oblivious to the
fact that the market is “normally embedded” in a given society and therefore
a “historically specific political creation.” 190 According to this view, the
neoliberal economic order cannot but remain a limited form of
generalization (“thick description”) within similar cases, not across them.191
Against this background, the U.S. trade war as a reincarnation of its
collective memory does not appear to easily vanish in the foreseeable future
for the following two reasons. First, it increasingly appears that the U.S.
collective memory on trade warfare is closing the minds of its policy elites,
who are “relatively impervious to evidence from the outside world which
contradicts their beliefs.” 192 They have become extremely resistant to
external criticisms and instead relied on either self-rationalization or denial
as a coping mechanism.193 Indeed, the U.S. power elites tend to mistake its
material power for its ideological superiority. 194 The U.S.’s hegemonic
power tends to extend the “cognitive distance” between the warped reality
nurtured by the U.S. collective memory and the authentic reality shared by
the rest.195
Second, collective memory is intersubjective. As is often said, the best
way to make an enemy is to find one. President Trump’s declaration of
187
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trade war against China sent an unequivocal signal. Yet, China has its own
version of collective memory regarding the United States in particular and
the Western powers in general, dating back to the colonial era. For
example, the May Fourth Movement was prompted by the notorious
“Betrayal in Paris.”196 In the Paris Peace Conference after the end of the
First World War, the United States, despite Woodrow Wilson’s celebrated
“Fourteen Points,” refused to return a German concession (Shandong) back
to China and instead handed it to the imperial Japan. Note that China had
sent 140,000 workers to help the United States and its allies on the Western
front. Given that the year 2019 marked a centennial anniversary of the May
Fourth Movement, China’s such collective memories seem to have been
refreshed and consolidated.
In the same vein, Henry Roediger and Andrew DeSoto observe that:
In China, people remember the period from roughly 1849 to 1949 as
the “century of humiliation.” The time was turbulent, from the First
Opium War (a defeat by the British) through many other defeats and
unfavorable treaties in which Chinese people were dominated by the
Japanese, French and English. Although the century was declared
over in 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was established,
the Chinese remember the sting of those times and still interpret
modern events through them. For example, in 1999 during the
NATO bombing of Belgrade as a part of the war in (former)
Yugoslavia, U.S. smart bombs hit the embassy of the People’s
Republic of China, killing three reporters. (…) For the Chinese, the
bombing was a sharp reminder of the century of humiliation and fit
the narrative of domination by the west, carried forward.197
China’s collective memory on colonialism tends to encourage the
contemporary Chinese public to perceive U.S. pressure through the lens of
humiliation.198 Since the Chinese Communist Party’s founding motto was
to stand up to such humiliation, it cannot look weak to its own people in
engaging the United States. 199 To China and Chinese people, its
rediscovered collective memory “represent[s] past aspirations and injustices
196
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to which the present generation must respond.”200 In sum, the clash of two
big echo chambers is more likely than not.
CONCLUSION: COUNTERING MEMORY
In his recent commentary, Jeffrey Sachs appositely summarized the
main thesis of this Article. Sachs argues that:
Generals fight the last war, and Washington’s economic war on
China is straight from America’s tactics against the Soviet Union
and its skirmishes with Japan in the 1980s. Yet China is neither the
Soviet Union nor Japan. The US’s aggressive trade actions towards
Beijing, unless suspended in the near future, will damage the world
economy and America itself.201
Then, what could be done for both countries to steer clear of the
collision course? Any deals, big or small, cannot but be stopgaps in the
presence of the Hobbesian culture. Any meaningful change must come
from an identity shift from both countries. In particular, the United States
needs to be more susceptible to external opinions different from their own
and cultivate counter-memories 202 that can disabuse itself of those myths
subscribed to by its power elites.
Without an intersubjective, and therefore objective, version of reality,
the United States fails to question the criteria of its own version of
reality.203 It fails to appreciate perils of trade wars and the resultant crisis,
as if political scientists failed to see the fall of the Berlin Wall coming and
economists failed to predict the Wall Street financial crisis. Both groups of
experts were blinded by warped realities impregnated by their own models,
such as realism and efficient market hypothesis, respectively.204 The only
200
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way for the current U.S. policy elites to overcome their own collective
memory is to resurrect the spirit of critique.205 Within the United States,
social stereotypes cocooned in collective memory must be challenged by
competing versions of memories and given opportunities to be reconstructed via the relentless work of both democratic reason and academic
endeavor.206
Also, the WTO’s therapeutic response in the form of re-socialization
must be in order. WTO members, as a whole, need to explore various
“ideational routes” toward community-building. 207 The WTO Secretariat
can advance counter-memory by invoking the WTO’s own collective
memory, even if that heralds a “new openness to intervention in national
affairs.”208 Concededly, re-multilateralization of the U.S. trade policy is a
tall order, given its hegemonic status and the contemporary populist
political culture. What is called for is a “cultural,” not necessarily political
or economic, dialogue, which does take time and patience. Non-legal
avenues, such as high-level consultation or various forms of social
marketing on the benefits of freer trade must be prioritized before the
United States can see its trading partner as “a partner in pursuit of some
value other than narrow strategic interest.”209 At the same time, the U.S.
government should train a new corps of negotiators and legal experts who
have not succumbed to solipsistic collective memory but are well-versed in
foreign language and culture.210
In the foreseeable future, however, these suggestions may remain ideal,
rather than practical. At least in the short-term, it is more likely that China
will exploit the U.S. collective memory on triumphalism. As in the past, the
two countries are inclined to wrap up the current trade war in a way that
bestows a semblance of victory upon the Trump administration by
following the pattern of Japanese concessions, including commitments to
additional market opening in key areas of the U.S. interests, such as
agriculture and financial services, as well as some policy changes in key
areas of the U.S. concerns, such as forced technology transfer.
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